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F R O M  T H E  E D I T O R
This issue of Hemisphere looks at a growing demographic and social problem in Latin America: aging populations and the shortage of services to meet their needs. The feature articles in this issue 
address different aspects of the problem.
As health indicators and medical care in the region have improved, more Latin Americans are living to 
reach old age. As Marfa Esther Lozano points out in her report on a pneumonia vaccination campaign 
in Mexico, lifestyle and demographic changes are bringing Latin America closer to the developed world 
in terms of chronic disease rates. Ailments typical of old age and sedentary lifestyles, such as diabetes 
and heart failure, are becoming more of a threat than the epidemic infectious diseases that limit longevi­
ty in developing countries. The region’s medical infrastructure is racing to meet the health needs of the 
elderly.
Improved medical treatment and longevity also take their toll on social services. Elderly people who 
survive illnesses but can no longer care for themselves create challenges for their families and other care­
givers. Ursula Karsch’s article on long-term care arrangements in Brazil describes how families cope 
when changing work patterns and economic circumstances make it difficult to maintain traditional 
extended family care networks.
The burden on families sometimes takes tragic expression in violence toward the elderly. Max 
Rothman and Burton Dunlop share their research on elder abuse in Miami and the need to raise com­
munity awareness of the problem here and elsewhere.
The decades of neoliberal reform in Latin America have also changed the way pension and retirement 
systems work. Carmelo Mesa-Lago reviews the different pension models adapted across the region and 
their implications for consumers and national economies.
Vida Yovanovich provides a devastating glimpse of the realities behind the statistics on aging with her 
photo essay of images from a Mexican old-age home. Her powerful photographs are a personal reflec­
tion on the fears of dementia, loss of dignity, physical decay and isolation that haunt many of us as we 
face the prospect of growing old.
Finally, Marian Goslinga brings back one of Hemisphere’s most popular features, a publications update 
of recent titles published on the topic of aging in Latin America.
Also in this issue are reports touching on some of the top issues in the news from Latin America in 
recent months. Juan Carlos Gamboa explores the Fujimori phenomenon and its implications for under­
standing presidential popularity in Latin America. George Grayson considers the potential benefits and 
pitfalls of the Puebla-Panama plan, Mexican President Vicente Fox’s proposal to integrate Central 
America and southern Mexico. The economic crisis in Argentina and its political and social costs is the 
focus of Robert Harding’s article. Further insight into the region’s financial state is provided by Greg 
Cancelada’s review of a new book by Pablo Toral—an FIU graduate student—on the logic behind 
Spanish expansion into the Latin American banking sector.
Coming up in the spring, the next issue of Hemisphere will feature a collection of articles on 
Colombia, a country that dominates the news from Latin America these days with stories of armed con­
flict and controversy over the eradication of illegal drug crops. Look for more LACC events and publi­
cations focusing on Colombia in the coming months.
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Argentina on the Edge
“Latin America is very fond of the word ‘hope.’ 
We like to be called the ‘continent of hope.’ 
Candidates call themselves the ‘candidates of 
hope.’ This hope is really something like a 
promise of heaven, an IOU whose payment is 
always being put off. It is put off until the next 
legislative campaign, until next year, until the 
next century.”
—Pablo Neruda
by Robert C. Harding II
A rriving at Argentina’s Ezeiza International Airport, one cannot immediately appreci­ate the depth of the 
country’s current economic and 
political problems. Along the 
Highway to the South, the ultra­
modern six-lane expressway from 
the airport to Buenos Aires, the 
initial perception is one of tran­
quility, the landscape broken only 
by miles of pampas grass and palm 
trees.
Once in Buenos Aires, however, 
it quickly becomes apparent that 
the “Paris of Latin America” is not 
as interested in glamour or com­
mercialism as it is in economic 
recovery. On streets throughout 
the city billboards advertise not the 
newest Sony computer or French 
perfume, but rather the success of 
President de la Rua’s administration 
in negotiating a $40 billion eco­
nomic bailout package (at a 16% 
interest rate) from the International 
Monetary Fund. This so-called 
b linda je (armor) has temporarily 
staved off possible default on the 
country’s massive $145 billion for­
eign debt, but the situation is far 
from resolved. By the mid 1990s, 
following a prolonged period of 
impressive economic growth (called 
“one of the great economic success­
es of the century” by former US 
Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher) and political calm, 
many Argentines had begun to feel 
relatively confident about their 
country’s future. But now, three 
years of economic recession have 
left Argentines almost neurotic 
with worry over the economy.
T h e  L e g a c y  o f  N e o l ib e r a l is m
The 1990s began with hope for 
change. In 1989, Carlos Menem’s 
main goal as Argentina’s new presi­
dent was to resolve the country’s 
economic and political malaises. 
After a bloody and, ultimately, eco­
nomically disastrous decade of mil­
itary rule (1973-1983) and the sub­
sequent civilian administration of 
Raul Alfonsm (1984-1989), 
Argentina was reeling from hyper­
inflation of more than 5,000% 
annually, military revolts by dis­
gruntled veterans of the Dirty War 
(.los carapintadas) and general pub­
lic apathy about the future. 
Through implementation of a strict 
neoliberal economic program, 
Menem gave up his Peronist tradi­
tions and was able to arrest the 
country’s economic seizures, 
breathing life back into the 
Argentine economy. Inflation was 
slashed and budget deficits were 
reduced.
Menem’s recovery plan consisted 
of two main initiatives. The first 
was privatization of state-owned 
enterprises. Though occurring 
amidst widespread, endemic cor­
ruption, the privatization program 
provided the Argentine government 
with a huge influx of cash and rid it 
of many ineffective enterprises. 
Practically all major state-owned 
firms and enterprises were sold off, 
including the buses, the phone sys­
tem, the national airline and the 
Buenos Aires subway system. The 
second part of the plan was a mon­
etary convertibility system linking 
the value of the Argentine peso to 
the US dollar. This had two imme­
diate effects: It brought a previous­
ly unknown stability to a currency 
that, like others in Latin America, 
had been frequently devalued to 
relieve debt, and it bolstered public 
confidence because corrupt public 
officials, for which Argentina is leg­
endary, could no longer manipulate
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RPulling back from the brink o f economic and social 
chaos
the exchange rate system. Bank 
accounts were frozen and a fresh 
round of loans was procured to pay 
off old debts. Not surprisingly, 
economic growth returned with a 
vengeance, rising to an impressive 
12% between 1990 and 1995. 
Many foreign observers praised 
Argentina as a model of economic 
reform in Latin America.
A decade later, the costs of this 
equilibrium are becoming apparent. 
Menem’s successor, Fernando de la 
Rua of the Radical Party, took 
office amid world financial turmoil 
caused, in part, by Russia’s econom­
ic problems. Argentina was experi­
encing the highest domestic interest 
rates in more than three years, and 
economic growth had declined by 
half. Moreover, the much lauded 
fixed exchange rate and reduced 
tariffs had spurred large trade 
deficits.
The signs of recession are every­
where. Though government statis­
tics put unemployment at 15%, 
this figure is dubious since the offi­
cial unemployment rate in 1996 
(pre-crisis) was 17%. Most 
Argentines scoff at the official fig­
ure, recognizing that the actual 
number is much higher, perhaps 
30%. Underemployment is also 
widespread; for an increasing 
number, participation in the infor­
mal economy is the only thing 
standing between survival and des­
titution.
A perfect example of the current 
dilemma is Buenos Aires’s ubiqui­
tous taxis. After privatization, for­
mer state workers were given sever­
ance payments of approximately 
$25,000 each. An astonishing
M im ing f o r  money in the streets o f  the San Telmo district o f  Buenos Aires. 
Photo by author.
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number of these freshly fired work­
ers took this money and invested in 
a taxi to make a living. Today, 
about one-fifth of all vehicles in 
Buenos Aires are taxis and many 
drivers spend their days prowling 
the city’s wide avenues and quaint 
cafe-lined streets seeking potential 
riders. Most come up empty-hand­
ed, and their frustration has led to a 
dramatic rise in taxi-related rob­
beries in which it is the driver rob­
bing the passenger rather than vice 
versa.
Other warning signs abound.
The city is littered with stores on 
whose front windows is forever 
emblazoned liquidation  and, in the 
past year, many businesses have 
reduced prices considerably in an 
only partly successful attempt to 
lure customers back. The unem­
ployed protest almost daily in front 
of Congress and the Casa Rosada 
presidential palace, and participants 
report that their numbers are grow­
ing.
T h e  S e a r c h  f o r  E c o n o m i c  
S o l u t io n s
On March 3, 2001, in an effort 
to kick start the flagging economy, 
President de la Rua dismissed his 
entire cabinet following the resig­
nation of the economics minister 
and the vice president. The next 
day, Defense Minister Ricardo 
Lopez Murphy was named the new 
economics minister. But, in a 
move that displays the volatile 
nature of this crisis, Lopez Murphy 
was sacked only two weeks later 
and replaced by Domingo Cavallo, 
Menem’s former economics minis­
ter and the mastermind of the 
peso-dollar convertibility plan.
Cavallo has stated that Argentina 
will not proceed to full dollariza­
tion and is, in fact, talking about 
devising a scheme to provide multi­
ple convertibility for the peso with 
other world currencies, particularly 
the euro. Upon taking office, he 
obtained broad powers from 
Congress enabling him to intro­
duce new fiscal initiatives in an 
aggressive bid to revitalize the econ­
omy, including a tax on financial 
transactions and lower tariffs on 
capital goods. He successfully 
engineered a $29.48 billion swap of 
short-term bonds for longer-term 
securities, saving a total of $16 bil­
lion in debt-service costs and 
prompting some analysts to predict 
an easing of the crisis.
International financial organiza­
tions also praised the move to cut 
public-sector salaries and pensions 
by 13%, and the IMF approved an 
$8 billion loan—$3 billion of 
which is dependent on restructur­
ing of the public debt.
But the solutions to Argentina’s 
problems may be more elusive than 
one would expect due to some par­
ticular characteristics. If it were a 
first-world country, Argentina’s 
debt would not be a problem given 
that its debt-to-GDP ratio is at 
about same level as the United 
States’ was eight years ago. But 
Argentina occupies a nebulous 
middle position among nation­
states: It is too poor to be rich and 
too rich to be poor.
First and foremost, future devel­
opment continues to be hampered 
by a lingering reliance on agricul­
tural exports. The country is so 
dependent upon these exports that 
it has even used them to try to sub­
sidize its industrial sector (via agri­
cultural profits), a self-defeating 
strategy. Nonetheless, efforts to 
diversify the economy by using 
Argentina’s middle development 
niche to market basic technologies 
to lesser developed countries have 
had only limited success, as in the 
sale of solar water pumps and 
robotics to Iran in the late 1990s. 
The legendary beef and wheat of 
Argentina’s glory days at the turn of 
the twentieth century still domi­
nate, but do not promote growth 
in the economy.
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Argentina benefits from many 
natural resources, a highly literate 
population, an export-oriented agri­
cultural sector and a diversified 
industrial base. However, it suffers 
from chronic economic turbulence, 
which recent policy has exacerbat­
ed. Ironically, the current econom­
ic instability is partially the result of 
previous attempts under Menem to 
salvage the economy. The average 
Argentine’s salary or pension has 
been deflated since mass privatiza­
tion left most Argentines in the 
ranks of the self-employed or in 
private-sector jobs. The looming 
danger is the possibility of a com­
plete structural downturn.
P o l i t i c a l  a n d  S t r u c t u r a l  
C h a l l e n g e s
Argentina’s difficulties owe more 
to historical and structural lapses 
than merely poor policymaking.
An example of what Guillermo 
O’Donnell has called a “delegative 
democracy,” Argentina suffers from 
an ineffectual and burdensome 
policymaking structure. The 
Argentine president commands too 
much power, enabling him essen­
tially to rule by decree. (Menem 
issued more than 12,000 decrees 
between 1989 and 1993). This not 
only overrides the legislature but 
also inhibits any sort of meaningful 
participatory policymaking with 
opposition parties or business and 
labor associations. Concentration of 
power has resulted in gross mis­
takes, given the lack of consultation 
with Argentina’s interest groups.
A baffling and inefficient rev- 
enue-sharing program between the 
provinces and the capital further 
complicates this economic muddle. 
All tax revenues collected in the 
provinces are sent to Buenos Aires 
and, in turn, the provinces can take 
out huge advances against the 
National Treasury, regardless of the 
availability of funds. This arrange­
ment has created incredibly strong 
provincial corporatist systems. In 
the outlying poorer provinces, such 
as the wine-growing Mendoza 
region, most employment is still 
with the government, allowing 
provincial governors to administer 
virtual fiefdoms. In fact, a recent 
central government plan to impose a 
countrywide hiring freeze until 2005 
to address budget deficits raised 
howls of opposition from the 
provinces, which are themselves 
some of the greatest contributors to 
the national debt.
These are merely symptoms of a 
much worse affliction. Argentina 
has become trapped by its own good 
intentions to lead Latin America’s 
neoliberal march out of the infla­
tionary chaos of the 1980s. The lat­
est IMF bailout has bought 
Argentina some time, but the long­
term prognosis is not promising.
The currency convertibility scheme 
brought temporary stability, but in 
the long term it has hampered the 
country’s ability to run its own econ­
omy and shape its future.
Argentina’s monetary policy is 
effectively being decided by the 
United States Federal Reserve, which 
does not necessarily take Argentina 
into account. Argentina’s ability to 
devalue its currency in an economic 
crisis, such as the one the country is 
experiencing now, has been essential­
ly eliminated. Argentine exports are 
expensive compared to those of 
neighboring countries, especially 
Brazil, which can (and does) devalue 
its currency. In addition, Argentina’s 
fairly strict pro-labor laws put it at a 
disadvantage vis-a-vis its Mercosur 
partners, which are undercutting 
Argentine exports. And now that 
hoof-and-mouth disease has been 
discovered among Argentina’s valu­
able cattle herds, the damage may be 
irreparable in the short term.
Lastly, there are ominous signs 
that the Argentine people are
expecting long-term economic 
instability. All over Buenos Aires 
on weekday mornings, customers 
line up outside banks to convert 
their savings into dollars. One 
bank teller described it as the worst 
run on accounts he had ever seen. 
And the Spanish and Italian con­
sulates (countries from which most 
Argentines trace their ancestry) are 
deluged by applications from chil­
dren and grandchildren of immi­
grants seeking to reclaim their 
European nationality as a safeguard 
if things get too bad.
Many local economists are calling 
for an end to peso-dollar convert­
ibility, even though a switch would 
go against the rising tide of dollar­
ization in Latin America (in 
Ecuador, Panama, and El Salvador 
the official currency is the US dol­
lar, and in Peru it is de facto). 
Proponents argue that historical 
evidence strongly supports the the­
ory that a country must be able to 
devalue its currency to promote 
exports, as was done successfully in 
Chile (1974-1979) and Mexico 
(post-198 5).
To salvage its economy, Argentina 
may have to desecrate the altar of 
neoliberalism and curtail some of 
the free market policies that have 
ruled the country for the past 
decade. The alternative is not 
inviting. Argentina stands at the 
edge, looking into the chasm of 
deep recession. Unfortunately, the 
bottom is nowhere in sight.
Robert C. H arding II  is assistant p r o ­
fessor o f  in ternational relations an d  
Spanish a t Lynchburg College in 
Virginia. He is the au thor o f  
M ilitary Foundations o f  Panamanian 
Politics (Transaction Publishers, 
2001). This article is partia lly based 
upon his research du rin g a M arch 
2001 visit to Argentina.
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Puebla-Panama
by George W. Grayson
M exican President Vicente Fox seeks to expand his country’s role in world affairs. The six-foot-five-inch chief executive— 
known as the Marlboro Man 
because of his imposing height and 
rugged good looks—is vigorously 
pursuing a two-year seat on the UN 
Security Council, acting to contain 
US military involvement in 
Colombia and shaping the bilateral 
agenda with Washington, especially 
on immigration questions. Another 
priority for Fox is the Puebla- 
Panama Plan (PPP), a proposed 
1,000-mile development corridor 
that would integrate southeastern 
Mexico with Central America, 
including Belize and Panama. So 
far the plan, which is being touted 
as a boost to historically marginal­
ized economic areas and indigenous 
communities, has generated as 
much controversy as it has support.
E c o n o m i c  a n d  P o l it ic a l  G o a l s
Fox, a former president of Coca- 
Cola for Mexico and Central 
America, is an ardent promoter of 
the PPP, which some proponents 
have christened a latter-day 
Marshall Plan. According to the 
Mexican chief executive, the initia­
tive would create “all the necessary 
highway, airport and port infra­
structure required for develop­
ment,” as well as electricity, oil and 
gas supplies essential for sustained 
growth.
Mexico contemplates building 
two refineries and a petrochemical 
complex in the zone, with pipelines 
linking the oil-endowed Isthmus of
Tehuantepec to Panama. Even 
before the five- to seven-year PPP is 
completed, Petroleos Mexicanos 
(Pemex), Mexico’s petroleum 
monopoly, will open gas stations in 
C ntral America—a move that 
Guatemalan President Alfonso 
Portillo claims will end “abusive 
exploitation” by multinational cor­
porations.
Fox insists that the economic 
boost from the PPP will uplift 
indigenous communities, especially 
those in Mexico’s southern Chiapas 
state. This area is home to the 
small but noisy Zapatista National 
Liberation Army (EZLN), which 
launched an uprising on January 1,
1994. In recent weeks, the ski- 
masked rebels have condemned as a 
“farce” the indigenous rights provi­
sions added to Mexico’s 
Constitution in August 2001. The 
Puebla-Panama gambit, Fox says, 
would enable Mexico to pay “the 
enormous debt” that it owes to the 
10 million Indians living in its terri­
tory.
Geopolitical goals also underlie 
the venture. When Central 
Americans speak of their “big broth­
er” to the north, they are referring 
to Mexico, not Uncle Sam. Even as 
he presents an increasingly benign 
Mexican image in the region, Fox 
wants to broaden his nation’s influ­
ence in Central America, where 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez 
is trying to win friends by supplying 
discounted oil to the depressed, 
energy-starved area.
Of course, there is also the 
domestic political angle. Southern 
Mexico remains a stronghold of the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI), which Fox bounced from 
power in mid 2000. Attracting 
businesses, spawning jobs and pro­
pitiating Indians in this region 
could further weaken the PRI, 
which governed Mexico for 71 
years. Already, the PRI has lost the 
governorships of Chiapas and 
Yucatan.
S u p p o r t e r s  a n d  D e t r a c t o r s
Portillo and other Central 
American leaders, whose countries 
are beset by poverty, unemployment 
and economic woes, have cheered 
the PPP like aficionados at a World 
Cup soccer match. They have 
already championed 16 potential 
projects to modernize higher educa­
tion, promote technological literacy, 
spur tourism, impel industrializa­
tion, uplift border areas and aid the 
five million Central American 
migrants who cross into Mexico 
each year.
Fox and the Central American 
presidents hope that private 
investors and international lending 
agencies—spearheaded by the Inter- 
American Development Bank 
(IDB)—will come up with the lion’s 
share of the monies for this multi- 
billion-dollar undertaking. Faced 
with a stagnant Mexican economy, 
the Fox administration can con­
tribute only $15 million to $20 mil­
lion annually.
The plan has an important backer 
in IDB President Enrique Iglesias, 
who coordinates the commission for 
the PPP’s financing and promotion. 
“The Puebla-Panama Plan can be a 
catalytic force to turn into reality 
many projects long desired in the 
Mesoamerican region,” he has said.
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Regional bonanza or boondogglei
Governors in most of the dozen 
affected Mexican states also have 
endorsed the program; however, the 
three holdouts govern strategically 
located states—Chiapas, Oaxaca 
and Tabasco—which boast large 
Indian populations.
Subcomandante Marcos, the 
leader of the Zapatista guerrillas, 
has excoriated the PPP as a ploy by 
“international capitalists and their 
lackey Fox to eradicate the indige­
nous culture, exploit the region’s 
resources and keep the local popu­
lation in servitude.” Although the 
EZLN largely engages in guerrilla 
theater and propaganda appeals to 
the domestic left and foreign 
NGOs, it is capable of sabotaging 
the road, communications and 
energy projects that must pass 
through rainforests and rugged, 
flood-prone terrain. Strengthening 
Marcos’s hand is the opposition 
voiced by the smaller, but better 
armed and trained, Revolutionary 
Army of the People’s Insurgency 
(ERPI), which has carried out 
strikes in states that lie in the PPP’s 
likely route.
In addition, Central America’s 
Catholic bishops have blasted the 
“neoliberal” plan for focusing on 
energy and infrastructure to the 
exclusion of human development 
and poverty. “Globalization in 
Latin America...has widened the 
gap between the rich and poor,” 
averred Gregorio Rosa Chavez, aux­
iliary bishop of San Salvador, who 
also highlighted the pernicious 
impact of corruption and impunity 
in the region.
Meanwhile, energy analysts worry 
that Fox’s grandiose design may
precipitate wrongheaded invest­
ments by Pemex, long a PRI honey 
pot, to which Fox pledged to give a 
“businesslike” orientation. The 
state enterprise, which generates 
37% of the national budget, cannot 
produce the volume of petroleum 
products required for a country 
where demand is rising by 4% per 
year. The firm’s director general has 
talked about building two new 
refineries and petrochemical plants 
in the PPP zone. But erecting new 
refineries may not be cost effective, 
and the idea baffles many econo­
mists. “Wouldn’t it make more 
sense,” one Pemex watcher asked, 
“to take advantage of shuttered 
refining capacity in the southeast­
ern US and the Caribbean basin 
than to spend billions of dollars on 
new facilities?”
Of course, labor leaders love the 
notion of more refining and petro­
chemical activities, regardless of 
efficiency. Such undertakings help 
avoid layoffs of Pemex’s 137,000 
employees, who produce about the 
same quantity of hydrocarbons as 
Venezuela does with less than half 
as many oil workers.
Environmental groups also 
denounce the project. They 
worry that convoys of heavy trucks, 
giant bulldozers and cranes will 
devastate the unique biodiversity in 
the corridor, where the rainforest is 
already being cut at an alarming 
rate.
T h e  C h a l l e n g e s  o f  
I m p l e m e n t a t io n  
While lauding the PPP, Mexico’s 
private sector has been slow to 
match its rhetoric with cash.
Owners of money-losing construc­
tion firms, for instance, have urged 
the government to barrel ahead 
with the megaproject, which they 
hope will generate contracts for 
their hard-pressed companies. 
Despite their eagerness for official 
largess, relatively few Mexican 
entrepreneurs regard the 65 million 
people—more than half of them 
dirt poor—in the region as an 
attractive market for sophisticated 
goods and services.
Although emblematic of Fox’s 
penchant for big concepts, the 
Puebla-Panama Plan raises more 
questions than it answers. In view 
of the deep recession afflicting the 
region, the Mexican president, his 
Central American colleagues and 
local governors should move cau­
tiously. Without first obtaining rig­
orous cost-benefit analyses, they 
could squander billions of dollars of 
public monies. Their failure to 
mobilize grass-roots support for the 
PPP—particularly in rebel-infested 
Chiapas—could find insurgents 
bombing expensive energy facilities, 
communications networks and 
highways. Such an outcome would 
do little to brighten Mexico’s star in 
the international firmament.
George W. Grayson teaches gov ern ­
m en t a t the College o f  William & 
M ary a n d  is an ad jun ct fe l low  a t the 
Center f o r  Strategic an d  International 
Studies. His fo r th com in g  book, 
Mexico: the Changing o f  the Guard, 
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The Politics of Hope
by Juan Carlos Gamboa
I
n November 2000, after allega­
tions of electoral fraud and the 
release of videos showing the 
head of his intelligence agency 
bribing opposition politicians, 
Alberto Fujimori resigned as presi­
dent of Peru. He tendered his resig­
nation from the safety of a hotel 
room in Japan, away from the ire of 
the Peruvian population.
Although many Peruvians today 
view Fujimori as the personification 
of corruption and deceit, they were 
once quick to hail him as the savior 
of their country. How do we 
account for this change of heart? Is 
distaste for corruption and impunity 
a sufficient explanation? Are current 
theories of presidential popularity 
useful in explaining the issue? What 
lessons can other leaders draw from 
Fujimori’s experience? The following 
discussion analyzes Fujimori’s popu­
larity ratings during his first term in 
office (1990-1995) in an attempt to 
answer these questions.
P u b l ic  O p in io n  a n d  t h e  
P r e sid e n t
The study of presidential approval 
ratings is a relatively new phenome­
non in transitional democracies, but 
it has been pursued in the United 
States and Europe for at least four 
decades. During this time, three 
perspectives have come to dominate 
the field.
According to a first approach, time 
is the most important factor in deter­
mining an executive’s approval rat­
ings. This line of thinking argues 
that a president’s successful showing 
in public opinion polls is only dis­
tantly related to his actual perform­
ance. After a brief honeymoon peri­
od immediately following his elec­
tion, a president can expect his rat­
ings to begin a process of slow 
decline. This downward trend may 
be interrupted by the successful han­
dling of specific policy crises, but the 
erosion of presidential support is 
largely inevitable and inexorable.
A second approach correlates the 
rise and fall in presidential approval 
with economic indicators, based on 
the argument that the economy is 
the most important factor affecting 
evaluations of presidential perform­
ance. Proponents of this theory 
might disagree over the role of per­
sonal (“pocketbook”) or national 
(“sociotropic”) economic considera­
tions in determining citizens’ politi­
cal preferences, but they share the 
assumption that voters are rational 
and self-interested actors. From this 
perspective—which can be summa­
rized in James Carville’s well-known 
phrase “it’s the economy, stupid”— 
presidential ratings rise when eco­
nomic conditions are good and drop 
as the economy falters.
A third widely accepted approach 
to presidential popularity focuses on 
the media’s agenda-setting capabili­
ties. From this viewpoint, news cov­
erage determines the topics society 
considers important, affects public 
attitudes toward certain issues and 
defines the areas in which presiden­
tial performance is judged. 
Consequently, popular presidents 
should be considered the result of 
frequent and favorable news cover­
age, while unpopular ones are the 
product of the media’s constant criti­
cism.
Are any of these perspectives suffi­
cient to explain Fujimori’s public
opinion performance? Not really, 
this article contends.
S t a b il it y  a t  a  P r ic e
The story of Fujimori’s first term 
in office is well-known. He took 
power in 1990 amidst a profound 
economic and political crisis, which 
included violent guerrilla activity 
countrywide. After his upset victory 
over novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, the 
new president took decisive steps to 
reform an economy that had nearly 
half of Peruvians living in extreme 
poverty. Faced with inflation rates of 
more than 7000%, he implemented 
a shock program that included the 
elimination of subsidies, price hikes 
for gasoline and public services, a lib­
eralized exchange rate, cuts to the 
federal bureaucracy, more “flexible” 
labor laws, and the creation of a new 
agency (SUNAT) to combat tax eva­
sion.
The initial result of these measures 
was even higher inflation and an ero­
sion of public support. But as 
Fujimori negotiated with global 
lenders to “reinsert” Peru into the 
global economy, enthusiasm for his 
programs began to increase. It grew 
even more after he dismissed 
Congress and suspended constitu­
tional rule in 1992. Eighty percent 
of Peruvians supported the autogolpe, 
allowing the president to overcome a 
weak start marked by popular dis­
trust of his economic program. This 
support was solidified with the cap­
ture in September 1992 of Abimael 
Guzman, the leader of the Shining 
Path guerrillas. Once it became evi­
dent that Fujimori’s government had 
gained formal legitimacy and that 
terrorism no longer represented a
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Fujimori’s case suggests that, rather than being 
led by time variables, economic success or posi­
tive media coverage, public approval ratings—at 
least in transitional democracies—could instead 
be guided by the executives capacity to alter 
popular expectations of the future via policy 
strikes.
major threat to the state, new and 
repatriated capital began flowing into 
Peru, providing a substantial boost to 
the economy.
But while Fujimori’s economic 
reforms succeeded in controlling 
inflation, promoting investment and 
stimulating growth, they had a 
strong negative effect on other 
important indicators, among them 
poverty and employment. During 
Fujimori’s first term, the number of 
poor people in Peru grew from seven 
million to 12 million. By 1995, half 
of the country’s population was liv­
ing in poverty. Joblessness also 
soared; by the end of 1995, only 
10% of Peruvians had stable work, 
70% were underemployed and 20% 
had no job.
Despite these grim statistics, and 
regardless of Fujimori’s unapologeti- 
cally authoritarian style, his populari­
ty grew at an impressive pace after 
1992 and stayed high until the end 
of his first term, as evidenced by his 
easy re-election in 1995. In fact, 
contrary to what could have been 
expected from a time-based explana­
tion of presidential popularity, 
Fujimori’s approval ratings were sub­
stantially higher in 1995 than they 
were at the beginning of his adminis­
tration.
Moreover, according to surveys 
carried out by Apoyo S.A., a respect­
ed public opinion firm, the president 
was able to draw on the support of 
the population as a whole, including 
those sectors that most ardently 
fought his 1990 candidacy (high- 
income groups) and those most 
affected by his economic policies 
(low-income Peruvians). Could this 
be an example of “sociotropic” atti­
tudes toward the economy outweigh­
ing personal, “pocketbook” factors? 
Surveys suggest that this is not the 
case (see Figure 1). Peruvians sup­
ported the president, but continued 
to evaluate both their families’ and 
the nation’s economic situation as 
negative or “average.” Despite the 
commonly assumed correlation 
between economic conditions and 
presidential approval ratings, factors 
relating to economic performance are 
insufficient to explain Fujimori’s 
popularity.
A careful look at news coverage 
also calls into question the validity of 
media-based explanations of presi­
dential popularity in this case. Peru’s 
lively news media offered generally 
favorable coverage of Fujimori, pre­
senting him as an active, hands-on 
leader. However, the news items 
they featured did not coincide with 
the issues that the public cited most 
often in polls. Between 1990 and 
1995, Peruvians consistently identi­
fied the economy and terrorism as 
the issues most important to them. 
But during the same period,
Peruvian newspapers and magazines 
devoted most of their front-page cov­
erage to high-profile political events, 
such as the closing of Congress and 
constitutional referendums. Social 
issues also took a back seat to politi­
cal coverage, although Peruvians con­
sistently ranked poverty and hunger 
among the country’s most serious 
problems.
In short, privileged coverage of 
issues in the media during Fujimori’s 
first term in office did not seem to 
translate into salience in the public 
mind. At most, the media could 
have had an indirect influence on 
popular perceptions of the president 
by presenting his initiatives in a 
favorable light. Given the discrepan­
cy between news coverage and the 
issues the public ranked as most 
important, it is reasonable to con­
clude that news coverage could not 
have had a direct effect on Peruvians’ 
evaluations of presidential perform­
ance.
Once we have discarded time, eco­
nomic and media-based theories, 
what is left? Close analysis of 
Apoyo’s polling data suggests that the 
most important factor behind 
Fujimori’s appeal was eradication of 
the terrorist threat and, especially, the
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Figure 1: Comparative Net Approval Ratings (1990-1995): 
The President and Economic Policy
80-
enormous expectations this issue cre­
ated among Peruvians (see Figure 2).
After the capture of the Shining 
Path leadership in September 1992, 
the administration’s antiterrorism 
policies earned Fujimori wholeheart­
ed support from a population that 
had been growing impatient with 
economic recession and the lack of a 
government social program. This 
achievement seems to have been 
enough to compensate for the presi­
dent’s perceived shortcomings in 
other areas, as illustrated in Table 1.
Reducing the terrorist threat was 
vital for the transformation of the 
national mood, single-handedly 
reversing Peruvians’ perception of the 
country’s future prospects at a time 
when a recession made it difficult to 
recognize the benefits of the admin­
istration’s economic program.
Indeed, by March 1993, just a few 
months after Guzman’s capture and 
despite serious doubts about the 
country’s economic performance, 
Peruvians began to feel optimistic for 
the first time in years. This situation 
was confirmed in June of that year, 
when positive evaluations of the 
country’s future surpassed the vital 
50% mark.
E x p e c t a t io n s  a n d  D e m o c r a c y
Fujimori’s case suggests that, rather 
than being led by time variables, eco­
nomic success or positive media cov­
erage, public approval ratings—at 
least in transitional democracies— 
could instead be guided by the exec­
utive’s capacity to alter popular 
expectations of the future via policy 
strikes. Judging from the Peruvian 
example, issues such as government 
corruption and regard for democratic 
procedures may be of little impor­
tance to voters.
In light of the astonishing popular­
ity he achieved, it is remarkable how 
little attention Fujimori paid to dem­
ocratic formalities. Equally striking 
is the negligible effect this factor had 
on public evaluations of his perform­
ance. Some of his policies—especial­
ly those related to the government’s 
antiterrorist strategy—undoubtedly 
contributed to political and econom­
ic stability in the short term, but 
they also implied a de facto milita­
rization of Peruvian society. Instead 
of moving the country toward a con­
solidation of democratic practices, 
Fujimori led Peru in a political 
regression characterized by blatant
------  Anti-Subversive Policy ------  President
Figure 2: Comparative Net Approval Ratings (1990-1995): 
The President and Anti-Subversive Policy
80-
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Ta b l e  1 :  E v a l u a t io n s  o f  F u ji m o r i ’s  G o v e r n m e n t  (Source: Apoyo S.A.)
Which has been the most positive aspect of Fujimori’s government in the past year?
DATE LOW INCOME MIDDLE INCOME HIGH INCOME
July 1991 Financial “reinsertion” Financial “reinsertion” Financial “reinsertion”
July 1992 Close Congress SUNAT Reduce inflation
July 1993 Capture terrorists Capture terrorists Capture terrorists
July 1994 Sendero’s defeat Sendero’s defeat Sendero’s defeat
Which has been the most negative aspect of Fujimori’s government in the past year?
DATE LOW INCOME MIDDLE INCOME HIGH INCOME
July 1991 “Shock” program “Shock” program “Shock” program
July 1992 Inflation not controlled Lack of social program Lack of social program
July 1993 Economic recession Economic recession Economic recession
July 1994 Lack of social program Dependence on military Economic recession
neglect of the law and open disregard 
of civilian institutions.
Such a governing style—which 
some analysts have come to call “del- 
egative democracy”—concentrates 
power in the presidency at the cost 
of other established institutions that 
play a balancing role, opening the 
way to abuses. Perversely, this con­
centration of power gives presidents 
the ability to conduct effective 
actions in economic, political or 
social areas bound to increase their 
popularity among their citizens. 
Through executive decrees and other 
forms of vertical governance, the 
president can take sole credit for the 
expedient and successful handling of 
specific problems, producing a phe­
nomenon similar to the “rally around 
the flag” effect observed during for­
eign policy crises in advanced 
democracies. Even if carried out by 
questionable means, successful policy 
strikes, feeding on public frustration, 
create hope among the population, 
allowing the government to resist 
and render ineffective scrutiny by the 
media, constitutional experts and 
other political actors.
In contrast, in any true representa­
tive democracy, one with functional 
institutions, the decision-making 
process is the product of protracted 
negotiations between divergent inter­
ests. As a result, government initia­
tives in a democratic setting tend to 
emerge slowly. This characteristic, 
which some might consider a defect, 
should actually be interpreted as a 
virtue, for it provides society with a 
certain degree of protection against
erroneous policies and ensures that 
responsibility for mistakes is shared 
among various political actors.
Fujimori’s concentration of power 
made it possible for him to deliver 
speedy solutions (which most 
Peruvians gratefully supported) and 
take full credit for them. In the 
process, however, he debilitated the 
country’s institutions and increased 
his chances of committing serious 
mistakes. Peruvians have had to pay 
the price for their willingness to sup­
port such a strategy.
Juan Carlos Gamboa is vice president 
f o r  Latin American pub lic affairs at 
Fleishman-Hillard, an international 
communications consulting firm . He 
has a Ph.D. in po litica l science from  
Tulane University.
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Pension “Privatization”
by Carmelo Mesa-Lago
n the last two decades, half 
of the countries of Latin 
America have undertaken 
structural reforms, or “priva­
tization,” of their social secu­
rity pension systems. This article 
discusses how much is true about 
this so-called privatization and the 
role of the state; in addition, it 
examines the impact of the reform 
on the insured, as well as its 
macro- and microeconomic effects.
T h r e e  M o d e l s  o f  R e f o r m  
I n s t e a d  o f  O n e
In 1979-1981, Chile pioneered a 
profound structural reform of its 
social security pension system. It 
did not have an impact on the 
region until the 1990s, and then 
mainly as a result of World Bank 
policies and pressures. By the end 
of 2000, 10 Latin American coun­
tries had enacted pension reforms 
but, instead of copying the suppos­
edly universal Chilean prototype, 
they followed three general 
models:
1. Substitutive, similar to the 
Chilean prototype and implement­
ed in Bolivia (1997), Mexico 
(1997), El Salvador (1998) and 
Nicaragua (enacted in 2000 but 
not enforced yet). In these coun­
tries, the public system was closed 
(new affiliations were not allowed) 
and replaced with a “privately” 
administered system (except in 
Mexico, where management is 
“multiple”; i.e., public, private or 
mixed). The new “private” system 
pays a pension based on the sum 
accumulated in the insured’s indi­
vidual account at the time of 
retirement.
2. Parallel, implemented in Peru 
(1993) and Colombia (1994). 
Under this model the public sys­
tem was not closed but reformed, 
becoming an alternative option to 
a private system with similar char­
acteristics to Chile’s. The current 
and future insured are allowed to 
switch between the two systems in 
Colombia. The administration is 
exclusively private in Peru but mul­
tiple in Colombia.
3. Mixed, implemented in 
Argentina (1994), Uruguay (1996) 
and Costa Rica (2001). Here too 
the public system was not closed 
but reformed, becoming one of 
two integrated components of a 
new, mixed system: the public 
component pays a basic pension, 
while the “private” component is 
administered by multiple institu­
tions and pays a supplementary 
pension.
O v e r s o l d  P r iv a t iz a t io n  a n d  
t h e  K e y  R o l e  o f  t h e  S tat e
In spite of “privatization,” half of 
the systems in the 10 countries are 
not exclusively managed by private 
corporations. Four countries with 
substitutive systems have exclusive 
private administration (Chile, 
Bolivia, El Salvador and Nicaragua, 
in law), as does Peru in its parallel 
private system. The three mixed 
systems have a combination of 
public administration in the basic 
component and multiple adminis­
trators in the supplementary com­
ponent. In the parallel models of 
Colombia and Peru, the public sys­
tem is managed by social insur­
ance, and both Colombia’s parallel 
“private” system and Mexico’s sub­
stitutive system have multiple 
administrators. The percentage of 
insured in the “private” system or 
component varies significantly 
among countries, from 100% in 
Bolivia and Mexico to 97-90% in 
Chile and El Salvador, 78-79% in 
Argentina and Peru, and 49-40% 
in Uruguay and Colombia (no data 
are available yet for Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua).
State intervention has proven to 
be absolutely necessary for the 
proper function and sustainability 
of the “private” system, through 
such mechanisms as mandatory 
affiliation; strong and detailed pub­
lic regulation of the system; con­
trol, monitoring and sanctioning 
through a supervisory public insti­
tution (state-financed in several 
countries); strict regulation of 
investment instruments and rank­
ing of them by a public institution; 
and a triple fiscal subsidy.
Pension reforms of the substitu­
tive and parallel types provoke 
heavy fiscal costs that account for 
this triple subsidy. First, the public 
system incurs a deficit; left without 
contributors, or only a minority of 
them, it retains the burden of all 
current pensions and those that 
will be eventually granted to the 
insured who stay in that system. 
The state finances this deficit in all 
countries. The second cost is the 
value of the contributions paid to 
the old system by all insured who 
move to the new system (often 
called a “recognition bond”). This 
value is adjusted annually to infla­
tion (except in Nicaragua), and 
two countries (Colombia and 
Chile) also pay an interest rate.
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The state is responsible for this 
cost in all countries except Mexico 
and Uruguay (Peru has granted few 
recognition bonds.) Third, a min­
imum pension is guaranteed to all 
insured in the new system whose 
accumulated sum in the individual 
account is insufficient to finance 
the minimum level. The state is 
responsible for this difference in 
five countries (Chile, Colombia, El 
Salvador, Mexico and Nicaragua, in 
law). Neither Bolivia nor Peru 
effectively grants this benefit.
Under the mixed model, the public 
component may generate a deficit 
(Argentina and Uruguay) or not 
(Costa Rica), but there is no need 
for a recognition bond, as the 
insured is guaranteed a basic pen­
sion in the public component.
T h e  E l im in a t io n  o f  E m p l o y e r  
C o n t r i b u t i o n  a n d  it s  E f f e c t s
Chilean reformers eliminated the 
wage contributions paid by 
employers to pension systems, 
arguing that they caused a distor­
tion in the labor market (i.e., an 
incentive to substitute capital for 
labor, hence restricting job cre­
ation). Bolivia and Peru later fol­
lowed suit. This argument has not 
been theoretically or empirically 
proved. The employer contribu­
tion may be transferred to con­
sumers or back to the workers, 
thereby avoiding labor market dis­
tortion. Most countries have not 
eliminated the employer contribu­
tion; four kept it unchanged 
(Argentina, Costa Rica, El Salvador 
and Mexico), one slightly reduced 
it (Uruguay), and three actually 
increased it (Colombia, Costa Rica
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“Privatization” of pensions varies among 
countries and cannot be acheived without 
significant state intervention and subsidies.
and Nicaragua). The insured con­
tribution was slightly reduced in 
Chile’s private system (but not in 
the public one), remained 
unchanged in Argentina, Costa 
Rica and Mexico, and was 
increased in six countries: Bolivia, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Peru and Uruguay. The financial 
burden of pension reform, there­
fore, has been shifted in most 
countries from the employer to the 
insured, and the elimination of the 
employer contribution has led to 
either an increase in the insured 
contribution or the fiscal subsidy.
D e c l in e  in  L a b o r  F o r c e  
C o v e r a g e
The percentage of pension cover­
age of the labor force in Latin 
America has been positively corre­
lated with the level of development 
and, specifically, with the size of 
the formal, salaried sector in any 
given country. Prior to the reform, 
the 10 countries under considera­
tion fell into three groups: (1) 
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and 
Costa Rica, with 70% to 80% cov­
erage; (2) Colombia, Mexico and 
Peru, 32% to 44%; and (3) Bo­
livia, El Salvador and Nicaragua, 
12% to 23%.
The percentage of the labor force 
covered after the reform can be 
measured based on the number of 
affiliates or active contributors.
The former are all those who have 
joined the system at some point, 
while the latter are affiliates who 
contribute regularly. At the end of
1998, the percentages of coverage 
based on affiliates and active con­
tributors were, respectively: 72% 
and 66% in Uruguay; 109% (sta­
tistically impossible) and 59% in 
Chile; 63% and 30% in Argentina; 
44% and 23% in Colombia; 36% 
and 23% in Mexico; 29% and 
20% in El Salvador; 26% and 13% 
in Peru; and 13% in Bolivia (no
data on active contributors). 
Estimates of affiliates before and 
after the reform indicate a decline 
in coverage in four countries; the 
exceptions were Uruguay and El 
Salvador (no significant change) 
and Chile and Colombia (an 
increase, but of doubtful magni­
tude in the former). Estimates of 
coverage based on active insured 
cannot be compared with data 
prior to the reform but they are 
significantly lower than those based 
on affiliates; the increase in the 
insured contribution could be one 
explanation for the fact that only 
an average of 55% of affiliates are 
active contributors (actual percent­
ages range from 44% in Peru to 
65% in Uruguay).
In a d e q u a t e  C o m p e t i t i o n  a n d  
H ig h  A d m in is t r a t iv e  C o s t s
Adequate competition among 
administrators of “private” pension 
programs is essential to improve 
efficiency and reduce management 
costs. In theory, administrators 
compete for an insured population 
that has sufficient information to 
choose the best option, based on 
the highest capital return and low­
est management commission. 
Available data suggest, however, 
that this model of competition is 
not functioning properly. The 
eight pension reforms demonstrate 
that the higher the number of 
insured, the higher the number of 
administrators, and vice versa.
Thus Mexico has 14 million 
insured and 14 administrators; 
Argentina, eight million and 13; 
Chile, six million and eight; 
Colombia, three million and six
(albeit with multiple types of 
administrators, which facilitate 
entry); Peru, two million and five; 
El Salvador, 670,000 and three; 
and Bolivia, 492,000 and two. In 
the latter country, the number of 
insured was so small that the gov­
ernment decided the market would 
allow only two administrators, 
divided the insured between the 
two by area of residence, and pro­
hibited changes. As a result,
Bolivia has no competition, but 
rather a duopoly.
Even with a fair number of 
administrators, a significant per­
centage of insured is concentrated 
in the biggest three: 100% in El 
Salvador and Bolivia (divided 
between its two administrators); 
78-75% in Chile and Peru (in 
Chile this concentration has steadi­
ly increased from 59% in 1983); 
69-60% in Uruguay and 
Colombia; 54% in Argentina; and 
45% in Mexico, which sets a maxi­
mum of 17% to each administra­
tor. In Chile, the three administra­
tors with the highest number of 
insured have neither systematically 
charged the lowest commissions 
nor paid the highest capital returns 
over time. Other reasons explain 
why the insured select these 
administrators: the work of sales­
men who earn a commission for 
every insured they move; gifts and 
other treats given to the insured as 
an incentive to switch; lack of 
information or skills to make edu­
cated decisions; and huge advertis­
ing campaigns that fail to provide 
data on performance.
If competition works improperly, 
then administrative costs should
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not decline, a conclusion support­
ed by data from nine countries.
The commission, exclusively paid 
by the insured and usually imposed 
on salaries, ranges from 4.1% in 
Mexico; 3.8-3.0% in Peru, 
Colombia, Argentina, El Salvador 
and Nicaragua; and 2.6-2.5% in 
Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia. 
Historical trends show that com­
missions have been stagnant or 
experienced very little reduction. 
The heavy administrative burden 
on the insured can be assessed by 
the percentage of wages that go 
toward commission over the total 
discount (commission plus deposit 
in an individual account): 32-30% 
in Peru, Argentina, El Salvador and 
Mexico; 26-20% in Colombia, 
Chile and Bolivia; and 17.5% in 
Uruguay.
H ig h  C a p it a l  A c c u m u l a t i o n  
a n d  R e t u r n s  b u t  D o u b t f u l  
I m p a c t  o n  N a t i o n a l  S a v in g s
According to the World Bank, 
structural pension reform has sev­
eral beneficial macroeconomic 
effects. These include increased 
capital accumulation and invest­
ment in the capital market (which 
becomes more developed and gen­
erates a high capital return or 
investment yield), and diversifica­
tion of the pension fund portfolio. 
These results in turn generate high­
er national savings and economic 
growth.
The data support some of these 
assumptions but reject others.
Eight countries have registered sig­
nificant capital accumulation in 
their pension funds: $33.24 billion 
and 40% of GDP in Chile; $16.78 
billion and 5% of GDP in 
Argentina; $8.30 billion and 2.5% 
of GDP in Mexico; $2.92 billion 
and 2.3% of GDP in Colombia; 
$2,274 billion and 2.5% of GDP 
in Peru; $472 million and 4% of 
GDP in Bolivia; $477 million and
1.3% of GDP in Uruguay; and 
$118 million and 0.4% of GDP in 
El Salvador (in all cases, percent­
ages are for 1998 or 1999 GDP). 
Annual real average yields from the 
inception of the reform until the 
end of 1998 or mid 1999 have 
been fairly high, too: 13% in 
Argentina; 11.3% in Chile; 10.1% 
in Colombia; 8% in Mexico; and 
7.5-7.4% in Bolivia, Peru and 
Uruguay. But these yields must be 
interpreted with some caveats. The 
figures are gross and administrative 
costs should be deducted to obtain 
net yields. In addition, all of the 
systems, except Chile’s, began in 
the 1990s when international mar­
kets had very high returns; the 
regional crises of 1995 and 1997- 
1998 reduced the yield consider­
ably. Oscillations of the capital 
market can generate quite different 
pensions in times of boom or bust. 
In Chile, for example, an insured 
who entered the system in the 
1980s will have a significantly 
higher pension than one who 
joined later.
Two studies of Chile, the coun­
try with the longest reform in 
operation and where many 
assumptions have been tested, 
show contradictory evidence con­
cerning the impact on capital mar­
kets and national savings. The first 
study, commissioned and published 
by tbe IMF, concluded that the 
empirical evidence coincided with 
the claim that pension reform con­
tributed to financial market devel­
opment and a more diversified 
portfolio, but cautioned that the 
results did not constitute sound 
proof that the reform was the deci­
sive factor in this outcome. The 
IMF study also acknowledged that 
the assumed impact of the Chilean 
pension reform on national savings 
was doubtful. The second study, 
carried out by a high official of 
Chile’s Ministry of Finance,
demonstrated that the net effect of 
pension reform on national savings 
was negative. In 1981-1996, it 
found, the annual average capital 
accumulated in individual accounts 
was 2.7% of GDP, but the fiscal 
cost was -5.7%, resulting in a neg­
ative net outcome o f -2.6% of 
GDP.
Chile’s pension fund portfolio is 
more diversified than it was in 
1983, when it was overwhelmingly 
invested in public debt instruments 
or deposited in state banks. By 
1999, however, 37% of the portfo­
lio was still in state debt paper, and 
only 13% was in stocks. Other 
countries have experienced little 
diversification of their portfolios; 
in Mexico, El Salvador, Bolivia and 
Uruguay, from 64% to 97% of the 
investment was in government debt 
paper in 1999. The proportion of 
investment in stocks was nil in five 
countries and only had significant 
shares in Peru (27%), Argentina 
(17%) and Chile (13%).
As these results show, “privatiza­
tion” of pensions varies among the 
10 countries and cannot be 
achieved without significant state 
intervention and subsidies. The 
outcome of reform has been mixed 
and many of its alleged positive 
effects have not materialized. This 
is an important lesson for the rest 
of Latin America and other regions 
of the world considering reform 
programs.
Carmelo Mesa-Lago is a professor 
an d  research scholar in in ternationa l 
relations a n d  Latin American studies 
a t Florida In terna tiona l University. 
He is the au thor o f  Market, Socialist 
an d  M ixed Economies: Comparative 
Policy a n d  P erform ance - Chile,
Cuba an d  Costa Rica.
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A Silent Enemy
by M ax B. Rothman and  Burton D. Dunlop
E
lder abuse in the United 
States, as in many other 
countries, traditionally 
has not been a high-prior­
ity policy issue. Typically, 
it has been overshadowed by more 
visible cases of domestic violence and 
child abuse. Except for an occasional 
high-profile case in a nursing home 
or other institutional setting, elder 
abuse, particularly when it involves 
family members in the home, does 
not receive much public discussion 
or analysis. Unfortunately, as case­
loads continue to rise, many impor­
tant issues remain in addressing the 
dynamics of treatment and preven­
tion. Better understanding of these 
issues in the United States may help 
countries throughout the Americas 
identify concerns in their own soci­
eties and design policies and pro­
grams to confront them.
Pa t t e r n s  o f  A b u se  
Elder abuse can be an act of com­
mission whereby either physical or 
psychological injury is inflicted on 
another person. It also can be mani­
fested as neglect, the failure to fulfill 
an obligation or duty to another per­
son, or as exploitation, the illegal use 
of another’s property. A national US 
study of 1996 data estimated that of 
approximately 44 million older 
adults 60 and above, 450,000 had 
experienced abuse, neglect or 
exploitation. This figure constitutes 
an incident rate of around 10 per
1,000 older adults.
A study the authors conducted of 
1997 data for Miami-Dade County, 
Florida identified an incident rate of 
5.36 per 1,000, or only 54% of the 
national rate. The discrepancy most
likely involves the underreporting of 
actual cases, but additional issues 
were identified that may be of 
importance to other jurisdictions. 
These include understanding the 
profiles of abuse victims and perpe­
trators; the level of recidivism; race, 
ethnicity and cultural influences; risk 
factors; the use of available data to 
assist policymakers and those respon­
sible for investigations; the availabili­
ty of appropriate treatment models; 
professional training; and communi­
ty awareness.
The reason for the apparent under­
reporting of cases of elder abuse in 
Miami-Dade County is unclear. 
Hispanics represent nearly 60% of all 
older adults in the county. We spec­
ulate that this group is significantly 
less likely to report elder abuse, espe­
cially when it occurs in the family. 
Unfortunately, the state of Florida 
agency responsible for investigating 
and providing services for victims 
does not collect data on ethnicity. 
Therefore, we could not analyze the 
profiles of victims and perpetrators 
based on this critical variable.
A crucial factor that emerged from 
the data, however, is the age of both 
the victims and the perpetrators of 
abuse. Nearly one-half of substanti­
ated cases involved victims 80 years 
of age or older. People in this age 
group were victims of maltreatment 
at a rate more than 2.5 times their 
proportion in the total population of 
older adults. Approximately three- 
quarters of victims were white and 
one-quarter were black. Women 
were victims in nearly two-thirds of 
substantiated cases.
More than 86% of perpetrators 
were under 60 years of age compared 
to 66% nationwide, strongly suggest­
ing that perpetrators are significantly 
younger in Miami-Dade County. 
More children or younger family 
members seem to be committing 
elder abuse in this area, but again, 
the reasons are unclear. Three-fifths 
of perpetrators were white and a little 
more than one-quarter were black 
(the rest were categorized as “other” 
or “unknown”). Approximately 
53.5% of cases involved female per­
petrators, climbing to 56.2% in cases 
involving a male victim.
T r a c k in g  t h e  W a r n in g  S ig n s
Some of the patterns that emerged 
from the Miami-Dade data have sig­
nificant implications for the way 
authorities address elder abuse. For 
example, a third of the South Florida 
cases involved at least one previous 
incident within the last year. This 
statistic leads us to conclude that the 
system of intervention and assistance 
to victims is not working effectively.
One major reason for this failure 
may be a lack of important informa­
tion at the state agency responsible
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for this system. Knowledge of risk 
factors or indicators that can be used 
to predict future abuse is critical to 
the state’s ability to respond effective­
ly in terms of identification, inter­
vention and prevention. If case data 
that address the issue of risk are not 
collected and made easily retrievable 
for those engaged in the system, the 
state’s ability to carry out its responsi­
bilities is dramatically reduced.
Many different factors may con­
tribute to elder abuse. Researchers 
have been able to describe the ele­
ments typically identified in family 
abuse situations, including victim 
characteristics, perpetrator character­
istics, and the history and dynamics 
of their interaction. The literature 
strongly suggests that the primary 
risk factors are: 1) past abuse; 2) 
physical or mental dysfunction of the 
older person; 3) financial dependen­
cy of an adult child; 4) emotional ill 
health of a dependent adult child; 
and 5) social isolation of the family. 
Such patterns could be discerned if 
information were available to track 
health status measurements, such as 
household structure (including the 
ages and relationships of each house­
hold member), and mental or per­
sonality disorders of victims and 
alleged perpetrators. Recording and 
computerizing the data that could 
help track these factors would assist 
key staff in achieving the state’s goals.
Another major factor that limits 
the state’s ability to respond more 
effectively to abusive situations is the 
low level of funding and the scope of 
services provided. The only source 
of funding in Florida is for long­
term care services for the victim; e.g., 
in-home services designed for frail
elders. These services are limited to 
addressing the victims physical situa­
tion, not the underlying issues of 
intra-family violence and prevention 
of future episodes of abuse. The 
state has no responsibility to address 
issues related to the perpetrator.
K e e p in g  t h e  P r o b l e m  in  t h e  
P u b l ic  Eye
Elder abuse is a complex issue that 
requires a more comprehensive 
model of explanation and treatment. 
Experience in responding to the 
broader category of domestic vio­
lence in the United States offers 
insight into the elements required to 
design a more comprehensive 
approach.
Models for addressing elder abuse 
should emphasize crisis intervention. 
In addition to the hotlines that 
already exist to report abuse, they 
should provide for special shelters, 
support groups, safety planning for 
the victims, imposition of legal sanc­
tions, and anger management servic­
es for the perpetrators. All of these 
approaches are intended to under­
score the importance of providing 
opportunities for victims to become 
more independent.
One of the most valuable lessons 
learned from the domestic violence 
experience is the importance of 
insuring that the issue of elder abuse 
has high visibility among both pro­
fessionals and the public. Designers 
and implementers of treatment and 
prevention models have an ongoing 
responsibility to ensure that profes­
sionals working in the system— 
investigators, police, fire-rescue per­
sonnel and others—receive both pre- 
and in-service training in the issues
addressed here. Training in inves­
tigative skills, understanding the 
importance and usefulness of case 
information and other related topics, 
such as substance abuse and sexual 
abuse, is vital to the success of state 
efforts. Those most likely to report 
elder abuse—doctors, nurses, social 
workers and others who come into 
regular contact with older adults— 
should be educated about risk factors 
and how to identify them. All pro­
fessionals need to understand the 
cultural dimensions of abuse and 
should be part of the continuing 
effort to expand community aware­
ness about elder abuse prevention, 
reporting and intervention.
Public awareness is perhaps the 
most important factor in a commu­
nity’s effort to prevent the occurrence 
of elder abuse. Public education 
campaigns related to each of the 
issues discussed here should be 
launched in collaboration with clergy 
and religious institutions as well as 
the local media, which can be effec­
tive in targeting geographic areas 
with high rates of abuse. The more 
information the public has about 
what constitutes abuse, how to rec­
ognize it, how and where to report 
it, what happens when a report is 
made, and what resources are avail­
able to assist victims, the more effec­
tively a community can generate 
resources to combat it.
Max B. Rothman, J.D., LL.M. is exec­
utive director o f  Florida International 
University’s Center on Aging. Burton 
D. Dunlop, Ph.D. is the cen ter’s direc­
tor o f  research.
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Battling a Killer
by M aria Esther Lozano Davila, Jorge Chavez Samperio and  M artin  Perez Ramos
ne of Mexico’s most 
notable social 
accomplishments in 
recent years is a sig­
nificant decline in 
mortality rates. Over the last four 
decades, average life expectancy has 
increased dramatically. Forty years 
ago, Mexican men could expect to 
live to the age of 56.5; today, male 
life expectancy is 72.8. The 
increase for women has been equal­
ly impressive, from 59.3 to 77.3. 
This change, along with a decline 
in the birth rate, has altered the 
demographic profile of the country. 
For the first time, Mexico has had 
to confront the social impact that 
results from a steady increase in the 
aging population.
As the nation’s largest health care 
provider, the Instituto Mexicano de 
Seguro Social (IMSS) has experi­
enced the pressure of this popula­
tion shift. In 1999, IMSS servic­
es—a benefit available to workers 
and their families—reached 
43,249,762 Mexicans, or 53.23% 
of the population. Older adults 
accounted for 12% of this total. 
The number of older adults using 
the institute’s services increased sig­
nificantly during the latter half of 
the 1990s. In 1994, IMSS had 
2,495,571 clients who were more 
than 60 years old; by 1998, this fig­
ure had risen to 3,040,460, or 
60.9% of Mexicans in this age 
group.
Over the same period, an econo­
my geared more toward industrial 
development has led to lifestyle 
changes that imply new health risks 
for older adults. A shift toward 
diets high in fat and salt; increased
alcohol and tobacco consumption; 
longer and more stressful work 
schedules—all have affected pat­
terns of health, illness, infirmity 
and death. Mexico is experiencing 
an epidemiological transition typi­
cal of developing countries, in 
which communicable diseases such 
as respiratory and intestinal infec­
tions continue to be a problem 
even as chronic degenerative dis­
eases are on the rise.
E d u c a t io n  a n d  P r e v e n t io n
In recognition of the growing 
numbers of elderly Mexicans,
IMSS has made serving this group 
one of its priorities via a special 
area known as the Programa de 
Atencion a la Salud del Adulto 
Mayor (Older Adult Health 
Awareness Program). The program 
has a double focus: first, it encour­
ages seniors to volunteer as com­
munity health advocates; and sec­
ond, it emphasizes a holistic 
approach that includes a range of 
educational, preventive, assisted liv­
ing, recreational, cultural and social 
programs. Among the most 
important preventive measures is 
vaccination against pneumonia, 
one of the leading causes of death 
and illness among older IMSS 
patients.
In the last three years, cardiovas­
cular ailments, cancer, diabetes and 
pneumonia topped the list of the 
10 leading causes of death among 
the 65 and older population in 
Mexico. This held true for both 
the national population and IMSS 
patients. The very young and the 
elderly are the populations most 
susceptible to pneumonia. The
risk increases if the patient already 
suffers from heart problems, chron­
ic respiratory difficulties, diabetes, 
alcoholism, cirrhosis of the liver, or 
any condition that weakens natural 
immunological defenses to the dis­
ease.
IMSS introduced the pneumo­
coccus vaccine as part of the Older 
Adult Health Awareness Program 
in 1994. The previous year, the 
institute attempted to overcome 
public skepticism with an educa­
tional campaign to increase under­
standing of the importance of 
immunization for those over the 
age of 60. The campaign culmi­
nated with a nationwide health fair, 
where the vaccine was offered for 
the first time. Since then, Mexico 
has instituted National Health 
Weeks two times a year to reinforce 
the vaccination program across the 
country. In 1994, 485,230 people 
were vaccinated; by 1998, the fig­
ure had nearly doubled, to 
940,933. Six years after it was 
introduced, the vaccine had been 
applied to 77.54% of IMSS 
patients in the 60 and older group.
The type of vaccine used by 
IMSS—a combination of 23 poly­
saccharides considered to be 
responsible for 80% of pneumonia 
cases in most countries around the 
world—has been reported in the 
medical literature to confer an 
average of five years of immunity 
to pneumonia, and in some cases 
up to 10 years. The period of 
immunity can be significantly less 
in children with diseases of the 
spleen or kidneys, and in older 
adults with multiple myeloma, 
Hodgkin’s disease or renal failure.
O
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Public health campaigns reduce pneumonia cases 
among older Mexicans
E a r l y  S u c c e s s  R a t e s  
In 1994, when the vaccination 
campaign started, IMSS patients 
had a slightly greater incidence of 
pneumonia than did patients using 
clinics affiliated with the Secretary 
of Health, which are open to all 
Mexicans. Over the next several 
years, however, this tendency was 
reversed. From 1994 to 1998, the 
rate of pneumonia among IMSS 
patients rose by 57.41%, compared 
to 67.30% nationally. The rate of 
infection among IMSS patients 
began a gradual decline in 1997, 
although mortality rates from the 
disease remained relatively con­
stant.
In addition to the decline in 
infection rates, the vaccination 
effort can be credited with launch­
ing public health awareness cam­
paigns that have found a positive 
response among the older adult 
population, as evidenced by the 
nearly 80% vaccination rate among 
this group.
Vaccination campaigns cannot be 
judged by their short-term effects. 
Many other factors may have con­
tributed to the decline in cases of 
death and illness from pneumonia 
in Mexico, among them socioeco­
nomic levels and cultural and envi­
ronmental influences. These fac­
tors may play a role in the discrep­
ancy between the illness rates 
reported by IMSS and the 
Secretary of Health. 
Epidemiological studies to deter­
mine the level of antibodies in the 
older adult population will be key 
to rating the vaccine’s ultimate 
effectiveness.
Dr. M aria Esther Lozano Ddvila 
runs the O lder Adult Health 
Awareness Program a t the Instituto 
Mexicano d e Seguro Socia l (IMSS). 
Dr. Jo rg e  Chdvez Samperio a n d  Dr. 
M artin Perez Ramos are m ed ica l 
program  coordinators.
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Surviving at Home
by Ursula M. Karsch
B
razil holds the second 
highest mortality rate 
for stroke victims in the 
world. This cerebrovas­
cular accident is the 
number one cause of death among 
Brazilian men and women aged 65 
and over. However, although reli­
able data on survival rates after 
stroke and degrees of disability are 
not yet available, the proportion of 
cerebrovascular disease as a cause of 
death in Brazil has been decreasing 
in the last 20 years among both 
sexes (male: 18.7% in 1980 and 
16.7% in 1991; female: 21.0% in 
1980 and 18.1% in 1991). As 
more patients survive strokes, many 
require ongoing care to cope with 
disabilities and perform routine 
daily tasks. The observed declining 
trend in case fatality makes it likely 
that the prevalence of stroke-related 
disability will increase in the com­
ing decades. In a health care sys­
tem that lacks the resources for 
long-term care, this places a heavy 
burden on families, the most com­
mon caregivers for dependent eld­
ers. The largest share of this bur­
den falls on women—daughters 
and wives—who often must give 
up jobs that they hold outside the 
home to care for their relatives, 
even when the additional income 
from their employment is sorely 
needed.
This article presents a few results 
of a study sponsored by the 
Overseas Development 
Administration, with grants from 
the Sandoz Foundation for 
Gerontological Research and 
Brazil’s Conselho Nacional de 
Pesquisa. It examined the caregiv-
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Caregiving arrangements for stroke survivors in 
Sao Paulo, Brazil
ing arrangements of 102 people 
who experienced functional losses 
after suffering a first episode of 
stroke at age 50 or over. In addi­
tion to yielding a profile of primary 
caregivers, the findings allow a 
glimpse of trends in the living situ­
ations of elderly stroke victims, 
many of whom are housebound 
after they are discharged from the 
hospital, and the coping strategies 
adopted by their caregivers.
T h e  S a m p l e
The study began in 1992 with an 
initial sample of 168 cases recruited 
among seven hospitals in various 
districts of Sao Paulo, Brazil’s 
largest city. According to the 1991 
Brazilian census, the proportion of 
men and women aged 65 and over 
living in urban centers increased by 
more than 30% since 1950. The 
latest figures available show 72.6% 
of men in this age group and 
79.7% of women living in cities, 
making urban areas the most likely 
setting for elders surviving in 
dependent care arrangements.
Like most of Brazil’s major met­
ropolitan areas, Sao Paulo is located 
in the southeastern part of the 
country. This region boasts excel­
lent medical assistance and a rela­
tive abundance of hospitals, and it 
has the highest level of per capita 
income in the country. It is also 
characterized by better working 
conditions and living standards 
than other parts of Brazil.
Of the initial 168 cases, 17 were 
used for pre-testing the question­
naire. The research began with the 
remaining 151 cases. During the 
data collection process, many cases
were lost as patients refused to take 
part in the study, moved away from 
town, were unreachable for data 
collection, survived with no func­
tional loss or died. The final sam­
ple included 102 cases.
Patients aged 50 years and over 
were visited in their homes three 
times over a period of about one 
year after the first stroke episode.
On each of the visits their care­
givers were interviewed by means of 
a questionnaire. The interviews 
gathered data about the profiles of 
the caregivers and the family sup­
port they received, as well as the 
dynamics of care provided for the 
dependent person.
Of the 102 patients, 80 survived 
with functional loss: 44.6% had 
partial paralysis, 3.6% were com­
pletely paralyzed and 25.0% experi­
enced partial hemiplegia. In addi­
tion, 19.6% of patients had diffi­
culty in communicating, 9.8% pre­
sented visual problems, 14.7% had 
difficulty swallowing, and 34.3% 
suffered mental disorders. Most 
patients had more than one of these 
impairments combined with other 
losses of functions. More than 
50% were unable to perform their 
usual daily activities and 71.6% 
were unable to leave the house on 
their own. Almost 70% were total­
ly dependent on someone else to 
accomplish at least one basic every­
day task.
Of the patients surveyed, 61.8% 
were married and 23.5% were wid­
owed. Forty-five (44.1%) were 
married to their caregivers. Eighty- 
nine (87.3%) of the caregivers were 
women; 67 of them (67.6%) were 
between 40 and 74 years old. In
total, 80.3% of the caregivers were 
40 years old and over and 78.43% 
were aged 60 and over. Almost 
58.8% of the caregivers were of the 
same generation as their patients— 
50 years of age and over—with a 
high concentration (38.2%) of 
caregivers aged 60 and over taking 
care of 80.3% of patients aged 60 
and over. In other words, two- 
thirds of the sample featured one 
elderly person looking after anoth­
er. Of the primary caregivers, 
39.2% were the patients’ wives and 
31.3% were daughters, confirming 
the vital role played by spouses as 
caregivers. Children were second to 
spouses in acting as caregivers 
(36.2%); 6.9% were sons-in-law or 
daughters-in-law.
H o u s e h o l d  C a r e  A r r a n g e m e n t s
Finances were a strain for most 
families in the sample. Nearly two- 
thirds—62.8%—had monthly 
incomes below $500 and 10% 
earned less than $100 a month. 
Almost 18% were couples living 
together, 11 % on $200 monthly 
income. This amount correspond­
ed at the time of the study to two 
pensions of one Brazilian minimum 
wage each.
More than three-quarters— 
79.4%—of the stroke survivors 
lived in households of more than 
three persons, including themselves. 
Fifty-six percent were living in their 
own homes and had acquired those 
properties 30 or 40 years before, 
when they were in a better financial 
situation and real estate prices were 
lower. Only two patients lived in 
shantytowns. Twelve percent lived 
in their children’s homes and 11%
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The largest share of the burden falls on 
women—daughters and wives—who often 
must give up jobs that they hold outside the 
home to care for their relatives, even when 
the additional income from their employ­
ment is sorely needed.
in their caregivers’ homes. Most— 
81.4%—lived in detached houses, 
which had been enlarged to accom­
modate married children over the 
years. The high cost of rent in 
Brazilian cities probably explains 
this kind of living arrangement for 
different generations. It seems to 
be the basis for strategies of reor­
ganizing family roles and is also a 
means for cooperation when an 
older relative becomes impaired. 
Ninety percent of the houses visited 
were in older parts of town where 
sewage, electricity and water sup­
plies were available, confirming the 
fact that a large proportion of 
Brazil’s elderly reside in well-estab- 
lished urban districts.
Most of the dwellings were sim­
ple. The majority were modest 
masonry houses, which in many 
cases lacked final touches such as 
painted walls or even cupboards. 
Bedridden patients (18%) always 
occupied what appeared to be the 
best bed in the house. Twenty- 
eight percent slept alone in their 
own bedrooms and 53% with the 
caregiver in the same room.
C r e a t iv e  S o l u t io n s
New living arrangements 
required many families to devise 
ingenious methods to meet the 
challenges of caring for a disabled 
relative. A quarter of the cases, 
especially those involving two-story 
houses, showed evidence of home
modification to meet patients’ 
needs. On the ground floor, living 
rooms were adapted to enable 
patients to spend the day there. 
Extra bathrooms were added on, 
usually making use of kitchen pipe 
systems, so that patients would not 
have to climb the stairs to reach the 
facilities. Beds were equipped with 
bars taken from the cradles of 
grown grandchildren. Eighteen 
percent of the families reported 
recycling and adapting various 
materials they had at home for use 
in daily care, thereby avoiding the 
need to buy new items. Metal con­
tainers were turned into bedpans; 
plastic chairs from the kitchen 
served double duty as shower 
chairs; broomsticks were trans­
formed into walking sticks. The 
kitchen sink substituted for an exer­
cise bar, and in one house, a pulley 
with a hanging rope was installed 
on the bedroom ceiling to help the 
patient exercise his legs. In other 
cases, bed sheets or towels served 
the same purpose.
Although 76.5% of patients’ chil­
dren did not live with their parents 
before the stroke, family reorganiza­
tion resulted in some 4% moving 
back into their parents’ homes.
Fifty percent of patients began 
receiving regular visits from their 
children, and in 25.5% of these 
cases the children took over shop­
ping previously done by the 
patients before the stroke episode
occurred. Grandchildren and 
friends also visited more often dur­
ing the first year after the stroke 
episode.
Thirty percent of the caregivers 
changed their daily domestic rou­
tines to care for the stroke patient. 
They varied their sleeping sched­
ules, going to sleep after the 
patients and waking up before 
them. They began dressing patients 
in clothing that was easier to put 
on and to remove, and special pads 
and sheets were adapted to the beds 
of those suffering from inconti­
nence.
A 63-year-old alcoholic, who had 
been separated for a year and a half 
from his wife of 35 years, stopped 
drinking and moved back into their 
house to take care of her after she 
suffered a stroke. This man was a 
bricklayer who earned around $250 
a month. Without proper equip­
ment or any type of orientation, he 
created his own coping strategies.
At first, he gave his wife sponge 
baths in bed and carried her to the 
bathroom in his arms. Later, he 
began to transport her by placing 
her feet on top of his feet and, in a 
move that resembled dancing, 
walking her around the house or 
outdoors to get some sun.
One woman who used to live 
alone began to look after her 66- 
year-old neighbor. Every day she 
would go to the patient’s house to 
help with chores. When she 
returned home, she would leave the 
neighbor sitting by the window so 
that she could keep an eye on her.
A patient who could not leave 
her bed when the interviewers first 
visited was supported by her five 
children. One of her daughters left 
her job to take care of her impaired 
mother. A year after the stroke, the 
interviewers returned to find the 
patient in the kitchen, where she 
was able to cook meals for the fam­
ily. She had learned to get around
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with the aid of a walking stick, thus 
allowing her children to go back to 
work and bring in a higher month­
ly income.
Fa m il y  B u r d e n s
Home health care in Brazil is a 
role traditionally undertaken by the 
family, especially by women, even 
when they have employment 
responsibilities outside the home. 
Men take on caregiving tasks most 
often when they are the spouse or 
son of the dependent person.
Caring for a dependent elder puts 
heavy strains on a family. Money, 
time, space and privacy are all con­
cerns. These pressures appear to be 
most pronounced immediately fol­
lowing the patient’s arrival home 
and after a longer period has 
elapsed. In the three cases 
described above, for example, the
caregivers’ outlooks varied during 
the first year following the stroke. 
Most (64.3%) were more positive 
about their situations when inter­
viewed for the second time. More 
of those interviewed on the third 
visit, one year after the stroke 
episode, were likely to have a nega­
tive assessment, reflecting the strain 
of long-term caregiving.
The lack of social policies in 
Brazil for dependent elders and of 
public health programs to provide 
long-term care for adults with func­
tional losses and social handicaps 
leaves family and friends with the 
responsibility to provide care and 
support. The percentage of 
patients in this study requiring 
assistance with personal care rou­
tines in the 12 to 14 months fol­
lowing the first episode of stroke 
shows the need for a public health
program to provide caregivers with 
information, orientation and some 
kind of support network. Such a 
program would be cost effective in 
the long term, contributing to 
faster rehabilitation and improved 
coping strategies while reducing re­
hospitalization and the use of nurs­
ing homes.
Dr. Ursula M. Karsch is a professor 
an d  researcher a t the Pontificia  
Universidade Catolica in Sao Paulo, 
Brazil. The research f o r  this p ro je c t  
was in itia ted  by Dr. Alexandre 
Kalache, d irector o f  the World Health 
Organizations Program on Health 
an d  Aging, who a t the tim e o f  the 
study was a professor a t the London 
School o f  H ygiene an d  Tropical 
M edicine.
Master of Arts in Latin American 
and Caribbean Studies
The Master of Arts in Latin American and Caribbean Studies responds to the diversity of discipli­
nary and subdisciplinary approaches to the study of Latin America and the Caribbean. The pro­
gram prepares students for doctoral-level studies in academic disciplines and for careers in the pub­
lic and private sectors. The program consists of 36 hours of course work, including a thesis and 
specialization in a discipline to be selected from the program’s core departments (Economics, 
History, Environmental Studies, International Relations, Modern Languages, Political Science, and 
Sociology/Anthropology).
For more information, contact: Theodore R. Young, Director of Academic Programs, Latin 
American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, University Park, DM 353, 
Miami, Florida 33199; telephone: (305) 348-2894, fax: (305) 348-3593; e-mail: youngtr@fiu.edu; 
website: http://lacc.fiu.edu
La t in  A m e r ic a n  a n d  
C a r ib b e a n  C e n t e r
F l o r i d a  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  U n i v e r s i t y
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Prison of Dreams
by Vida Yovanovich
I
 was about to reach 40, and so 
much was moving inside of 
m e.. .My mother had just 
been diagnosed with 
Parkinson’s. I’m terribly 
afraid of old age!
My first self-portrait was the 
product of a self-imposed task.
One morning I set my camera on 
the tripod, stood in front of it, and 
clicked. Well, this is pretty simple,
I thought. Later, when I looked 
closely at the contact sheet, I closed 
my eyes and cried. I could not 
believe it. How could a self-portrait 
give away everything inside like 
that, everything that’s hidden and 
protected?
The image was perfectly framed, 
with a hardness that, even today, 
hurts me when I look at it. The 
photograph remained in a drawer 
for years. I did not mention it, I 
did not show it, I did not recognize 
it within myself. I hid it.
I think it is difficult to put what 
one feels into photographs, the 
things one goes through as one 
takes them, and at the same time it 
is impossible to forget, or become 
detached from the experience.
It took me quite a few years to 
finish this project, set in an old-age 
home in Mexico. Time, the passing 
of time, and the fraying the passing 
of time causes...
And I took my time, to little by 
little come closer to this world of 
women’s old age.. .Most were 
women, there were only a handful 
of men because men die younger. 
Women are alone in the end, easily 
abandoned.
It was like ripping myself open. 
At first, whenever I left the home,
I’d wash my hands with a terrible 
sense of contagion. I could not 
photograph, I could only feel.
Over the years, I became trans­
parent. I became one of them, part 
of the place itself. It was hard at 
night. The women who during the 
day had been my friends, at night 
became my enemies and, in the 
dark, would scream at me to go 
away.
When I took my self-portrait, I 
guess I was depicting my inability 
to face up to time, my passage 
through time, my fear of death, and 
the knowledge that not only the old 
women were dying, but many 
things inside me were also dying.
These are photographic closeups, 
to help me understand and accept 
in me, the passing of time.
Vida Yovanovich is a photographer in 
Mexico City. Her work has appeared  
in books, magazines a n d  exhibits 
a round  the world. She was awarded  
a Simon Guggenheim Fellowship in 
2000 an d  has served  on the board o f  
directors o f  the Mexican Council o f  
Photography. The text a n d  images in 
this ph oto  essay are excerpts from  her 
book, Cdrcel d e los suenos (Mexico 
City: Casa d e las Imdgenes,
D irection General d e Publicaciones, 
Centro d e la Imagen, 1997). Her 
photographs are also displayed a t 
www.zonezero.com . She can be 
reached a t vidayov@ terra.com.mx.
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Spain’s New Empire
by Gregory D. Cancelada
The Reconquest o f  the New  
World: M ultinational Enterprises 
a n d  Spain’s D irect Investment in 
Latin America, by Pablo Toral. 
United Kingdom: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd., 2001.
While covering the 1998 annual 
conference of the Inter-American 
Development Bank, I asked a 
French banker about the Spanish 
invasion of Latin American bank­
ing. The topic intrigued me since 
I found pat answers unconvincing 
and unable to explain why other 
global players stood on the side­
lines while BBV and Santander 
gobbled up local banks.
“Of course they have to go to 
Latin America. Where else can 
they go? They can’t compete in 
Europe,” the banker snorted.
Although clearly an example of 
sour grapes and in no way a com­
plete explanation, the comment 
was illuminating.
I was searching for further 
insight from The R econquest o f  the 
New World: M ultinational 
Enterprises a n d  Spains D irect 
Investm en t in  Latin America, by 
Pablo Toral.
The book, based on Toral’s mas­
ter’s thesis, is an ambitious work 
and quite timely. The Spanish 
multinational enterprise (MNE) 
has had a tremendous impact on 
the Latin American banking, 
telecommunications, energy and 
aviation sectors, and until now no 
extensive studies have explored 
why and how.
Toral’s biggest contribution is 
linking Spanish MNE behavior to 
the liberalization of Spain’s econo-
T H E  P O L I T I C A L  E C O N O M Y  O F  L A T I N  A M E R I C A  S E R I E S
OF THE NEW WORLD
Multinational enterprises and Spain's 
direct investment in Latin America
Pablo Toral
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Spanish firms were forced to become multi­
national enterprises in response to greater 
competition in their home markets as the 
European Union forced down trade and 
investment barriers. This coincided with 
Latin America’s own liberalization and need 
for foreign capital.
my. He paints an interesting pic­
ture of Spanish firms forced to 
become MNEs in response to 
greater competition in their home 
markets as the European Union 
forced down trade and investment 
barriers. Foreign competition at 
home was a key impetus for mov­
ing abroad, which in turn coincid­
ed with Latin America’s own liber­
alization and need for foreign capi­
tal.
The author then tries to explain 
why particular Spanish sectors 
went into Latin America and other 
foreign MNEs failed to compete 
aggressively against the Spanish.
He offers some diverse reasons, 
such as cultural affinity and the 
activist role of the Spanish state, 
but finds they aren’t adequate 
explanations for the behavior of 
Spanish MNEs.
Drawing on the ideas of econo­
mist Stephen Hymer, Toral distills 
two reasons that Spanish MNEs 
aggressively entered Latin America. 
He integrates other theories, but 
these appear to be the key ones.
First, the Spanish had a different 
perception of risk in Latin America 
than did other foreign competitors. 
For a variety of reasons, Spanish 
businessmen had more confidence 
in the ability of Latin American 
policymakers to implement pro­
found economic reforms.
Second, Spanish MNEs were 
looking to control Latin American 
businesses, versus making portfolio 
investments, to make the most of 
their competitive advantage. This 
advantage stems from the fact that 
Spain only recently became a 
developed country and thus had 
valuable knowledge of how a 
developing economy functioned 
and what kind of services it need­
ed.
These arguments raise some 
important questions about the link 
between MNE theory and the 
actual behavior of the Spanish 
MNEs.
For example, the author says that 
Telefonica, the Spanish telephone 
giant, had a competitive advantage 
in Latin America since it could 
expand access to the general popu­
lation, while US telecom MNEs 
only focused on implementing the 
latest technology (pp. 132, 172). 
This assertion is extremely impor­
tant for Toral, since it plays into 
point two and is really the only 
reason he gives for Telefonica’s suc­
cess in the region.
Is he right? The argument 
sounds reasonable, but only a 
vague comment by a Telefonica 
executive is offered to back it up.
In fact, line growth—a basic 
yardstick for measuring fixed-line 
expansion—for Telefonos de
Mexico (Telmex) in 1999 and 
2000 was much higher than rates 
by Telefonica’s Argentine, Peruvian 
and Chilean operations. Yearly 
line growth by Telefonica’s Latin 
American operations managed to 
stay in double digits over the past 
two years due solely to the compa­
ny’s Brazilian operations. Telmex, 
which is controlled by Carso 
Global Telecom, has SBC Corp of 
the United States as its strategic 
telecommunications partner.
Toral uses similar assertions to 
explain the success of the Spanish 
banks. He argues that banks such 
as BBV (now BBVA) and 
Santander (now BSCH) were 
attracted to Latin America not 
because the region offered higher 
returns than in the Spanish mar­
ket, but because they could meet 
the financial needs of the public 
and local businesses (p. 149, 150). 
This competitive advantage was 
due to the fact that Spain was a 
developing financial market during 
the 1970s and 1980s, according to 
Toral.
But if the Spanish offered a 
range of financial products and 
services seen as superior by the 
general public, why was the 
Spanish business model driven by 
acquisitions? Why not head-to- 
head competition, in which the 
Spanish banks expanded their busi­
ness by building new branches and 
offices?
I suspect that acquisitions are 
not only a cheaper route, but also 
that Spanish products are not in 
fact superior to those offered by 
local bankers. The heavy promo­
tion of lotteries to bank account 
holders is an indication that gam­
bling is more effective in attracting 
customers to Spanish banks than 
the strength of their products.
Instead, Spanish banks’ competi­
tive advantage versus local banks 
probably lies in greater efficiency,
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which translates into enhanced 
profitability rather than higher 
deposit rates or lower transaction 
fees for the public. The Spanish 
banks are able to be more efficient 
thanks to better lending and credit 
risk experience, technology and 
access to cheap international capi­
tal.
Still, the Spanish banks’ advan­
tages are no greater than those 
enjoyed by other foreign banks. 
The question remains why other 
foreign competitors have had a low 
profile in Latin America, at least 
until the last few years.
As Toral points out, Spanish 
banks were quite aggressive in the 
privatization of local banks seized 
by Latin American governments 
during financial crises in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Again, he claims that 
Spanish banks had more confi­
dence in policymakers’ ability to 
turn around the macroeconomic 
situation, and saw growth potential 
instead of the risks seen by other 
foreign banks (p. 149).
An equally convincing explana­
tion, however, is that Spanish 
banks, due to their lack of interna­
tional experience prior to the 
1980s, didn’t understand cross- 
border risk and expanded well 
beyond a conservative banker’s 
limits.
This is not as farfetched as it 
might sound. BBVA and BSCH 
are facing a tough situation in 
Argentina, where the country may 
not be able to sustain the 10-year- 
old currency board system that 
pegs the peso to the dollar.
If Toral needs to construct elabo­
rate competitive advantages that 
are unique to the Spanish MNEs it 
is because he rejects return on 
equity (ROE) as a driving force for 
MNE behavior (p. 4).
While he is correct in noting 
that ROE by itself does not prop­
erly explain MNE behavior, dis­
missing it outright removes a pow­
erful tool in understanding MNE 
motivation, at least among public 
companies with active sharehold­
ers.
ROE not only can explain why 
Spanish banks jumped into Latin 
America, but it also offers a reason 
why US banks avoided the region.
During the 1980s and 1990s, 
financial liberalization was occur­
ring in the fragmented US banking 
industry. Banks were not only able 
to offer new products and services 
that were previously regulated 
heavily or prohibited, but also 
could now easily cross state and 
regional borders. US banks could 
sharply raise their ROE by enter­
ing new lines of business or 
through mergers and acquisitions.
On the other hand, Spanish 
banks were already universal 
banks—i.e., they could offer a full 
range of financial products and 
services—and the market was 
highly consolidated. The possibili­
ty of higher ROE in fragmented 
and underdeveloped markets seems 
a more compelling incentive.
That isn’t to say that Spanish 
MNEs didn’t have a particular 
competitive advantage versus other 
multinationals. Toral points out 
some possibilities, but one of the 
most important is undoubtedly the 
Spanish language itself.
Toral sees language as merely 
facilitating interactions (p. 130) 
and puts it in the general category 
of “cultural affinity.”
The common language is 
extremely important, however. It 
permits Spanish firms not only to 
move human capital (managers, 
technicians) more quickly and effi­
ciently than US firms, but also 
allows them to impose their busi­
ness model through the export of 
Spanish managers into Latin 
America. Replicating management 
on such a scale would seem to
greatly reduce the risk that a busi­
ness model can’t be successfully 
executed.
The main weakness of the book 
lies with its sourcing. The author 
obtained much of his material 
from official sources (reports by 
Spanish government and multilat­
eral organizations), economists and 
academics, with a smattering of 
newspaper and magazine items. 
However, to understand the behav­
ior and local environment of 
MNEs, one should consult such 
basic sources as annual reports, fil­
ings with US and Spanish securi­
ties regulators, analysts’ reports, 
industry magazines, specialty 
financial publications, intensive 
searches in key newspapers, and 
interviews with executives and ana­
lysts who cover the companies and 
sectors. Toral sourced the 
Telefonica annual report for only 
one year (2000) and included no 
annual reports for Spanish banks, a 
serious omission.
Toral’s study is a useful overview 
of the MNE literature and global 
analysis of Spanish capital flows 
into Latin America. It is a first 
step in developing a solid, insight­
ful and credible explanation of 
Spanish MNE behavior.
Gregory D. Cancelada began cover­
in g  Latin American business new s in 
1990. Previously the Caracas 
bureau c h i e f  fo r  D ow Jon es a n d  the 
M exico City bureau c h i e f  f o r  
BridgeNews, h e is curren tly a busi­
ness reporter a t the St. Louis Post- 
Dispatch.
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Aging in Latin America
by M arian Goslinga
I
n today’s youth-oriented cul­
ture, aging is not a popular 
topic. Yet the graying of the 
world’s population is forcing 
us to come face to face with 
the issue and its corollaries—retire­
ment, living facilities, pension 
funds, medical care and poverty.
No longer can we ignore the 
challenges posed by an aging popu­
lation. Global life expectancy has 
grown more in the last 50 years 
than over the previous 5000. Until 
the Industrial Revolution, people 
aged 65 and over never constituted 
more than 2% or 3% of the popu­
lation. In today’s developed world, 
they amount to 14%. By the year 
2030, according to United Nations 
estimates, they will reach 25% to 
30%, placing an unprecedented 
burden on working-age people.
As far as Latin America and the 
Caribbean are concerned, it is 
expected that, by the year 2025, the 
region’s elderly will constitute 
10.8% of the population—an 
increase of more than 3.5% since 
2000.
This stunning growth of the eld­
erly—due mostly to medical 
advances and social provisions— 
demands the urgent attention of 
governments, think tanks and 
research centers.
The following citations represent 
a summary of the relevant literature 
on the aged produced within the 
last 10 years and are intended to 
complement the articles featured in 
this issue of Hemisphere.
Ageing in Latin America: Myths, 
Stereotypes, and Social Justice.
A geing International, vol. 19, no. 2 
(July 1992), pp. 26-29.
Alvarez, Maria D., and Otto Von 
Mering, eds. Aging, Demography, 
and Well-Being in Latin America.
Gainesville, Fla.: Center for 
Gerontological Studies, University 
of Florida, 1989. 161 pp
Anzola Perez, Elias, ed. La aten- 
cion de los ancianos: un desafio 
para los anos noventa. Washing­
ton, D.C.: Pan American Health 
Organization, 1994. 488 pp.
-----[etal.]. Analisis comparativo
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Venezuela. Washington, D.C.: Pan 
American Health Organization,
1993. 18 pp.
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Latinoamericano, 1994. 198 pp.
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Risks, the Labour Market, and 
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University of Hertfordshire, 1999. 
25 pp. [Deals mostly with Chile].
---- . Pension Reform and the
Individual Capitalisation Pension 
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1997. 32 pp.
---- . Pension Reform in Latin
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1997].
Bravo, Jorge. Envejecimiento de la 
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en America Latina. CEPAL 
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(December 2000), pp. 251-257 
[Also available online at 
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Publications].
CELADE Population and 
Development Area. Ageing: Four 
Dimensions of a Society for All 
Ages. Santiago de Chile: Naciones 
Unidas, 1997. 42 pp. [Presented 
at the World Congress of 
Gerontology held in Adelaide, 
Australia, 19-22 August 1997].
Chackiel, Jean. El envejecimiento 
de la poblacion latinoamericana: 
;hacia una relacion de 
dependencia favorable? Santiago 
de Chile: CEPAL/CELADE, 2000. 
37 pp.
Checkoway, Barry. Empowering 
the Elderly: Gerontological 
Health Promotion in Latin 
America. A geing a n d  Society, vol. 
14, no. 1 (March 1994), pp. 75-96 
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initiatives to promote the health 
and well-being of Latin America’s 
elderly].
Chelala, Cesar A. La salud de los 
ancianos. Washington, D.C.: Pan 
American Health Organization,
1992. 30 pp. [Also published in 
English as Adult Health in the 
Americas].
Chesnais, Jean Claude, and Susana 
Schkolnik. El proceso de envejec­
imiento de la poblacion. Santiago, 
Chile: CEPAL/CELADE, 1990.
145 pp.
Conferencia Intergubernamental 
Iberoamericana sobre Poh'ticas para 
Adultos Mayores y Personas con 
Discapacidad (3d : 1993 : Santiago 
de Chile). Envejecimiento en 
America Latina: implicaciones y  
desafios. Santiago de Chile: 
Programa Adulto Mayor, Ministerio 
de Planificacion y Cooperacion,
1993. 103 pp.
Conferencia Latinoamericana en 
Odontogeriatria (1st: 1992 : 
Taxco, Mexico). Memorias [de la 
conferencia convocada del], 27 al 
31 de octubre de 1992, Hacienda 
El Chorrillo, Taxco, Gro. Mexico 
City: Facultad de Odontologi'a, 
Universidad Nacional Autonoma, 
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dental care for the elderly],
De Vos, Susan. Extended Family 
Living Among Older People in 
Six Latin American Countries.
Jou rna l o f  Gerontology, vol. 45 (May 
1990), pp. 87-94.
Dulcey, Elisa [et al.], eds. 
Envejecimiento: experiencias y  
perspectivas. Bogota: Asociacion 
Interdisciplinaria de Gerontologfa, 
1995. 197 pp. [Papers presented 
at the 1995 conference Simposio 
AIG sobre Envejecimiento in 
Bogota, Colombia],
Encuentro Latinoamericano y 
Caribeno sobre las Personas de 
Edad: Seminario Tecnico. Santiago 
de Chile: CEPAL/CELADE, 2000. 
581 pp. [1999 meeting in Santiago, 
Chile].
Garay, J. Ageing in Latin 
America: Present and Future 
Problematic. Geriatrika, vol. 13, 
no. 8 (197), pp. 13-15.
Gerontologia y geriatria ‘96= 
Gerontology, Geriatrics ‘96: pro­
grama, resumenes [de las conferen- 
cias convocadas del] 6 al 10 de 
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Convenciones de La Habana,
Cuba. Havana: [s.n.], 1996. 303 pp.
Golbert, Laura, and Susana 
Schkolnik. El desafio de la seguri- 
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Santiago, Chile: Regional 
Employment Program for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (PRE- 
ALC), 1989. 83 pp.
Grushka, Carols O. Adult and 
Old Age Mortality in Latin 
America: Evaluation, Adjustments 
and a Debate over a Distinct 
Pattern. Thesis-University of 
Pennsylvania, 1996.
Gutierrez Robledo, Luis Miguel. 
The Ageing Situation in Latin 
America. Impact o f  S cience on 
Society, no. 153 (1989), pp. 65-80.
Hermalin, Albert I. Setting the 
Research Agenda on Aging in 
Latin America: Lessons from Asia.
Ann Arbor, Mich.: Population 
Studies Center, University of 
Michigan, 1995. 36 pp.
Hernandez Castellon, Raul. El 
envejecimiento de la poblacion en 
Cuba. 2d ed. Havana:
Centro de Estudios Demograficos, 
Universidad de La Habana, 1997. 
105 pp.
Hoskins, Dalmer D., Donata 
Dobbernack, and Christiane 
Kuptsch, eds. Social Security at 
the Dawn of the 21st Century: 
Issues and New Approaches. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 
2001. 352 pp. [Includes section 
on Latin America].
Interamerican Development Bank. 
Protection social para la equidad y 
el crecimiento. Washington, D.C.: 
IDB, 2000. 247 pp. [Discusses 
poverty and aging in Latin 
America].
Koop, C. Everett, and Clarence E. 
Pearson. Critical Issues in Global
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4th CRI Conference 
on Cuban and Cuban- 
American Studies
March 6-9, 2002
Held every 18 months, CRI's Cuban and Cuban-American studies con­
ferences convene scholars and students from around the world. Panels 
cover all areas of intellectual inquiry relevant to an understanding of the 
history, economics, politics, culture, society and creative expressions of 
Cuba and its diaspora. Since 2002 is the centenary of the establishment 
of the Cuban Republic (1902), this era in Cuban history will be a main 
focus of the 2002 conference. A series of cultural events will complement 
the academic sessions.
To register or fo r  more information, contact:
CUBAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Latin American and Caribbean Center 
Florida International University 
University Park, DM 353 
Miami, FL 33199
Tel. (305) 348-199/Fax: (305) 348-3593 
E-mail: crinst@fiu.edu
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